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 The Medical Liability Reform Debate in Context 
  
In his 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush called on Congress to restrict 
patient access to the courts, claiming that access to healthcare is threatened because “lawsuits are 
driving many good doctors out of practice.”1  But, according to statistics published by the 
American Medical Association (AMA), the number of practicing physicians is growing faster 
than the population.2   
 
President Bush has claimed that medical malpractice lawsuits send physicians’ 
malpractice insurance premiums “skyrocketing.”3  But recent news reports reveal that medical 
malpractice insurers are making huge profits.4  In Florida, one of the AMA’s “crisis” states, the 
Office of Insurance Regulation reported that the 15 largest medical malpractice insurers saw 
profits of $803 million in 2005.5   
 
It is clear that this call for limits on the ability of injured patients to seek redress in court 
is just one piece of a larger effort by the business lobby to protect businesses from being held 
accountable when they recklessly or negligently hurt people.   
 
To enlighten the debate about the most effective ways to ensure patient access to high-
quality health care, Public Citizen reviewed the most recent publicly available data from the 
federal government’s National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).  The NPDB contains data on 
malpractice payments made on behalf of doctors as well as information about disciplinary 
actions against them by state medical boards or hospitals.  Most payers of malpractice claims are 
insurance companies; but the data also include payments by entities such as state-run insurance 
funds and self-insured health care providers.   
 
Overall, the data show that President Bush is misdiagnosing the health care problem.  The 
court-based compensation system is, on the whole, a rational one that provides money for valid 
claims and dismisses invalid ones.  These findings are confirmed by other research, including a 
recent study conducted by researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health in which the 
authors found that “portraits of a malpractice system that is stricken with frivolous litigation are 
overblown,” going on to note that “the malpractice system performs reasonably well in its 
function of separating claims without merit from those with merit and compensating the latter.”6
 
This report examines the issue of medical liability in two parts.  The first part reviews 
NPDB data and shows that the claims of the business and medical lobbies are exaggerated and 
unsupported by the facts.  The second part examines data related to physician error and 
discipline.  This section notes some disturbing trends and reveals that the real medical crisis is 
the high incidence of preventable medical error, as well as the lack of accountability for a small 
set of doctors who commit a substantial number of avoidable errors that seriously injure patients. 
 
 Fundamentally, an agenda that blames injured patients and seeks to close access to the 
courts – contravening a Constitutional right – is about protecting business profits over patient 
health.  It is far past time for real health care reform, and for a health care system that puts 
patient safety first.
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 Key Findings 
 
• Medical Malpractice Payments Are Actually Declining.  The number and the total value 
of malpractice payments to patients have been flat since 1991.  Both show a significant decline 
since 2001, when the last so-called “crisis” began.7 
 
• The number of malpractice payments declined 15.4 percent between 1991 and 2005. 
• Adjusted for inflation, the average annual payment for verdicts declined 8 percent 
between 1991 and 2005. 
• Payments for million-dollar verdicts were less than 3 percent of all payments in 2005. 
 
• Payments Correspond to Severity of Injury.  The medical liability system is not 
irrational – patients do not win big jury awards for frivolous claims.  Instead, evidence shows the 
current system works reasonably well.  Patients with minor injuries receive little compensation, 
while the bulk of malpractice awards occur in cases involving severely debilitating injuries or 
death.   
• Over 64 percent of payments in 2005 involved death, or major or significant injuries. 
• Payments for “insignificant injury” were less than one-third of 1 percent of payments 
in 2005. 
 
• Patient Safety Is the Real Crisis.  The latest NPDB data underscore the fact that the real 
medical malpractice crisis continues to be inadequate patient safety, rather than the legal system. 
Instead of being distracted by business lobby myths about the court system, heath care providers 
should improve patient safety and better protect the health of patients.  
  
• Improving Patient Safety Will Save Lives.  One-third of malpractice cases resulting in a 
malpractice payment in 2005 (4,504) involved the death of a patient.8  Yet, as a 1999 landmark 
study by the Institute of Medicine showed, an estimated 44,000 to 98,000 patient deaths occur 
each year as a result of preventable medical errors in hospitals.9 Stemming preventable errors 
alone would, conservatively, prevent ten times as many deaths as are now accounted for by 
malpractice cases. 
 
Note on the Data 
 
Those making malpractice payments are required to report them to the NPDB under 
provisions of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.  The NPDB makes available an 
aggregated Public Use File that omits all personal or hospital identifying information.  
Information provided to the NPDB is confidential except it is disclosed to medical boards, 
hospitals and HMOs.  Within the health care industry, the NPDB provides a repository of data 
which entities employing doctors can query as part of a background check. 
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 Part I:  The Medical Liability System  
Produces Rational Outcomes 
 
The Doctors Company, a medical malpractice insurance carrier, claims that, “[u]nlimited 
and unpredictable jury awards lead to unlimited and unpredictable risk for liability insurers. 
Because insurance premiums are set by assessing the risk, premiums in states without effective 
reforms have skyrocketed.”10   
 
The latest national data on physician malpractice payments, however, show that 
malpractice awards are neither “unpredictable” nor skyrocketing.  In fact, Public Citizen’s 
analysis of information from the NPDB reveals major flaws in the insurance and business 
lobby’s story. 
 
Annual Number of Malpractice Payments Is Down 
 
During a July 13, 2006, hearing by the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, U.S. Rep. Nathan Deal (R-Ga.) said, “[t]here is no denying the fact 
that there is a medical liability crisis in this country.”11   
 
But the number of malpractice payments paid on behalf of doctors declined substantially 
over the past four years – from 16,588 in 2001 to 14,033 in 2005, a drop of 15.4 percent.  Over 
the past 14 years, the number of payments rose only 4.7 percent. (Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1: Total Number Of Malpractice Payments With 
Judgments and Settlements
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Medical Malpractice Payments per Population Continue to Decline 
 
The number of payments per 100,000 people in the U.S. also fell since 2001 – from 5.82 
to 4.73 – a decline of 18.6 percent.12  Since 1991, the number of payments per 100,000 people 
declined more than 10 percent. (Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2: Malpractice Payments Per 100,000 
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Total Value of Malpractice Payments Flat Since 1991 
 
When adjusted for medical care services inflation, the total value of malpractice 
payments changed very little from 1991 to 2005 – rising from $2.11 billion to $2.14 billion.  This 
modest increase reflects an average annual growth rate of less than half of one percent.   
(Figure 3) 
Figure 3: Total Value of Malpractice Payments
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Judgments Are Not Irrational 
 
American Medical Association President Donald Palmisano told the 2004 Annual 
Meeting of the AMA House of Delegates that “what is driving this crisis are the out-of-sight 
awards some runaway juries are handing out in certain liability cases.”13  This assertion is 
incorrect on the facts – when adjusted for inflation, the median judgment grew only from 
$125,000 in 1991 to $139,100 in 2005, a mere $14,000 over 14 years. Such a modest increase 
hardly suggests that juries are irrational.  (Figure 4)   
 
Figure 4: Judgments Constant 
When Adjusted For Inflation
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Million-Dollar Judgments Are Less Than 1 Percent of the Total Number of Payments 
 
The Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform claims that, “[s]ince 1994, the 
average medical malpractice verdict has increased to $3.5 million from $1.1 million.”14  This 
misleading statistic is meant to leave readers with the impression that plaintiffs regularly receive 
millions of dollars from lawsuits.  The Chamber’s statistic is particularly misleading because 
most verdicts are reduced by judges, often pursuant to state law.  What a jury awards is often not 
the actual amount paid to compensate the victim. 
 
In fact, according to NPDB data, the annual average payment for a medical malpractice 
verdict has not exceeded $1 million in real dollars since the beginning of the NPDB.  The 
average payment for a medical malpractice verdict in 1991 was $284,896.  In 2005, the average 
was $461,524.  Adjusting for inflation, however, shows that the average is actually declining.  
The 2005 average adjusted for inflation is only $260,890 — a decline of 8 percent since 1991. 
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The truth is, the number of payments for judgments of $1 million or more is tiny — never 
exceeding one-half of one percent of the annual total number of malpractice payments over the 
last 14 years.  In 2005, they were only one-quarter of one percent of all payments.  (Figure 5a) 
 
Figure 5a:  Payments for Judgments of $1 Million Are Mere 
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Million-Dollar Judgments Were Less Than 3 Percent of Total Value of Payments in 2005 
 
Contrary to the impression sought to be created by the Chamber of Commerce, over 97 
percent of the total value of malpractice payments are payments under $1 million.  The few 
million-dollar verdicts are only a miniscule portion of the total value of medical malpractice 
payments.  Furthermore, using 2005 as an example, payments of $1 million or more were less 
than three percent of the total value of all judgments. (Figure 5b) In the same year, payments of 
$5 million or higher were less than one-half of one percent of the total value of all judgments. 
 
Figure 5b:  Payments for Judgments Over $1 Million as 
Percentage of Total Value of Payments (2005)
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Severe Injuries Account for a Majority of Payments 
 
In 2003, President Bush described the medical liability system as “a giant lottery.”15  
This assertion, however, is unsupported by the facts.  Rather than providing irrational awards to 
undeserving plaintiffs, the current medical liability system is rational in its outcomes.  Over 64 
percent of payments in 2005 involved death, or major or significant injuries.  Thirty-two percent 
of the number of payments in 2005 involved cases in which the patient died.  Insignificant 
injuries, by contrast, were less than 2 percent of the number of payments.  (Figures 6a and 6b)   
 
Figure 6a:  Most Severe Injuries Account For 
Majority of Number of Payments
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Figure 6b:  Less Severe Injuries Account For 
Minority of Number of Payments
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Medical Liability System Is Rational In Outcomes 
 
The values of payments made to injured patients correspond appropriately to the degree 
of harm suffered by the victims.   Victims with a “minor permanent injury” receive 55 percent 
less than those suffering a “significant permanent injury.”  The highest payments go to the 
families of victims who died as a result of medical malpractice.  This confirms the findings of the 
Harvard School of Public Health recently published in the New England Journal of Medicine16 
and completely refutes assertions that medical justice is “worse than random.”17 (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7: 2005 Median Payment By Injury Type
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Categories of severity are those used in the NPDB. 
 
82 Percent of Total Value of Payments Compensate Most Severe Injuries 
 
As noted, the value of payments, as a percentage of the whole, corresponds to the severity 
of the injury.  Payments for “emotional injury” are a very small part of the total value of 
payments – less than 1 percent of the medical malpractice payments in 2005.  Payments for 
“insignificant injury” are less than one-third of 1 percent of payments.18   
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In fact, even “minor permanent injury” is less than 8 percent of payments.  “Significant 
permanent injury” is 82.6 percent of the total value of payments, and “death” accounts for more 
than 32 percent of payments for the most severe injuries.  (Figure 8) 
 
Figure 8:   Over 82 Percent of Total Value of Payouts
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The Proportion of Surgical and Obstetrics Payments Flat Since 1991 
  
The proportion of surgical and obstetrics payments as a part of all payments was virtually 
unchanged between 1991 and 2005.  In 1991, 9.7 percent of all payments were for obstetrics 
cases; in 2005, the figure decreased to 9.0 percent.  Surgical cases accounted for 26.0 percent of 
payments in 1991, and 26.2 percent of payments last year.  Claims that surgeons and ob/gyns 
face a growing threat of litigation are simply not borne out by the facts.  (Figure 9) 
 
Figure 9: Trends In Surgical and Obstetrics Payments
26.2%26.0%
9.0%9.7%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f a
ll p
ay
m
en
ts
Surgery-related Payouts As Percentage of Total Number of Payouts
Obstetrics-related Payouts As Percentage of Total Number of Payouts
 
 
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch 9      Medical Malpractice Payment Trends 1991 – 2005 
Part II:  Patient Safety and Doctor Discipline  
 
In 1999, a landmark study by the Institute of Medicine found that an estimated 44,000 to 
98,000 patient deaths occur each year as a result of preventable medical errors in hospitals.19  A 
new report by the Institute of Medicine, published in July of 2006, found that “medication errors 
are surprisingly common and costly to the nation.”20  This is the true health care crisis.  Attention 
focused on the false claims of the business lobby diverts much-needed resources for work to save 
lives by reducing preventable errors. 
 
By enacting measures to improve patient safety, doctors and hospitals can lower their 
exposure to liability while at the same time improving the quality of health care they provide to 
their patients.  The potential for patient safety initiatives to lower costs and save patients’ lives is 
well demonstrated by the success of reforms adopted by anesthesiologists in the 1980s – by 
adopting practice guidelines to protect patient safety, both the number of deaths and the value of 
malpractice premiums dropped for anesthesiologists.21  
 
In addition, state medical boards are falling behind in their efforts to ensure that 
physicians who commit repeated acts of medical negligence are held responsible for their 
actions.  In 2004, problems with the Nevada State Medical Board were found to be so pervasive 
that Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley stated that:  
 
“The board doesn’t care about the inaccurate numbers it reports, 
the inconsistencies in the actions it takes, the backlogs in its work 
or the horrible instances of failing to catch doctors doing harm that 
undermine the public’s faith in the board.”22
The problem of State Medical Boards’ failure to enforce high standards of care is not 
limited to Nevada.  Our analysis of NPDB data shows that only 33 percent of doctors who made 
10 or more malpractice payments received any disciplinary action by their state medical board.  
Even more disturbing, NPDB data show that physicians with up to 31 medical malpractice 
payments totaling millions of dollars in damages never received any disciplinary action. 
 
We are fortunate to live in a country with a high number of highly qualified physicians.  
In order to best protect their reputation and practice, and to protect the health and well-being of 
patients, we must focus attention and resources on the real problems.  By focusing on patient 
safety, we can dramatically lower both the cost of malpractice insurance and the number of 
avoidable medical injuries. 
    
In a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, Senators Hillary Clinton and 
Barack Obama wrote that “the [medical liability reform] discussion should center on a more 
fundamental issue: the need to improve patient safety.”23  What seems like a fundamental part of 
our health care system has been too often overlooked – the need to regularly update patient 
safety guidelines in order to reduce the risk of avoidable medical injury. 
 
In the American health care system, state medical boards are responsible for ensuring that 
the physicians practicing in state meet high standards of competency and care.  Unfortunately, 
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state medical boards too often ignore individuals with repeated problems.  This can result in 
tragedy, as happened in 2001 when a surgeon practicing in Hawaii implanted the shaft of a 
screwdriver in a patient’s spine.  During the trial in which the surgeon was found liable for 
medical malpractice, it was uncovered that the physician, credentialed to practice in Hawaii, had 
previously been suspended from practicing in both Oklahoma and Texas.24
  
The latest NPDB data show that patient safety and doctor discipline are two areas of the 
health care industry that require immediate attention. 
 
Some Common, Preventable Errors Are Increasing 
 
Several of the most common types of errors producing malpractice payments 
significantly increased over time as a proportion of all errors.25   Meanwhile progress has stalled 
in reducing the errors that are easiest to avoid.  “Failure to diagnose” cases, for example, grew 
from 16 percent of payments in 1991 to 19 percent in 2005.  “Improper Performance” cases grew 
from 10 percent to 15 percent of payments. (Figure 10) 
 
Figure 10: Proportion Of Most Common Errors Over Time
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Error classifications as listed in the NPDB. 
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Easily Preventable Errors Show a Marked Increase Since 2003 
 
The number of payments for easily avoidable errors, such as leaving a foreign object 
inside a patient, or operating on the wrong body part, fell from 874 in 1991 to 576 in 1997, and 
then remained relatively constant until 2004, when incidents increased dramatically.  The most 
recent data reflect the highest number of such errors in 11 years. (Figure 11) 
 
Figure 11: Easily Preventable Errors 
Up 40 Percent Since 2003
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Easily preventable errors include:  Surgical or other foreign body retained, wrong body part, wrong 
patient, wrong treatment, wrong medicine, failure to protect against infection, and wrong blood type.  
These identifications are taken from the NPDB. 
 
Since the Beginning of the NPDB, 5.9 Percent of U.S. Doctors Were Responsible for 57.8 
Percent of the Number of Medical Malpractice Payments 
 
The insurance lobby continues to perpetuate the myth that medical malpractice litigation 
is a giant “lottery” in which lawsuits are random events unrelated to quality of care.  If this were 
so, we would expect to find that a large proportion of U.S. doctors were responsible for 
malpractice payments.  But data from the NPDB shows that the problem of malpractice is not 
random.  In fact, since the inception of the NPDB, only 18 percent of doctors have been 
responsible for even a single malpractice payment.  A serious problem is the small percentage of 
doctors who paid multiple claims and who are responsible for much of the malpractice in 
America.  By strengthening patient safety and training while disciplining repeat offenders, the 
amount of malpractice could be dramatically reduced. 
 
• The vast majority of doctors – 82 percent – have never had a medical malpractice payment 
since the NPDB was created in 1990. 
 
• Just 5.9 percent of doctors have been responsible for 57.8 percent of all malpractice 
payments since 1991, according to data from September 1990 through 2005. Each of these 
doctors made at least two payments. 
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• Just 2.3 percent of doctors, having three or more malpractice payments, were responsible for 
32.8 percent of all payments.  
 
• Only 1.1 percent of doctors, having four or more malpractice payments, were responsible 
for 20.2 percent of all payments. 
 
Figure 12: Number and Amounts of Medical Malpractice Payments 
To Patients Paid on Behalf of Doctors, 1990-2005 
 
Number of 
Payment 
Reports 
Number of 
Doctors 
Who Made 
Payments 
Total 
Number of 
Payments 
Percent/Total 
Doctors 
(777,859)* 
Percent of 
Total Value 
of Payments 
Percent of 
Total Number 
of Payments 
Total Amount 
of Payments 
All 140,008 223,617 18.00% 100.00% 100.00% $50,807,346,000 
1 94,293 94,286** 12.12% 41.27% 42.16% $20,966,431,500 
2 or more 45,715 129,331 5.88% 58.73% 57.84% $29,840,914,500 
3 or more 17,596 73,325 2.26% 33.09% 32.79% $16,809,942,400 
4 or more 8,144 45,106 1.05% 20.18% 20.17% $10,250,793,100 
5 or more 4,091 28,989 0.53% 12.93% 12.96% $6,570,145,650 
 
* Based on number of physicians in 1998, the midpoint of the period studied, as reported by the American Medical Association. 
** Numbers in columns two and three of this row do not correspond precisely as a very small number of payment reports in the 
NPDB do not include an amount. 
 
Doctors with Repeated Malpractice Payments Experience Few Consequences 
 
Unfortunately, state medical boards and health care institutions do not do enough to rein 
in those doctors who repeatedly make medical errors and commit medical negligence. According 
to Public Citizen’s analysis of NPDB data, disciplinary actions such as license suspension or 
revocation are infrequent for physicians whose negligence caused multiple malpractice 
payments.  
 
• Only 8.61 percent of doctors who made two or more malpractice payments were 
disciplined by their state board.  
• Only 11.71 percent of doctors who made three or more malpractice payments were 
disciplined by their state board.  
• Only 14.75 percent of doctors who made four or more malpractice payments were 
disciplined by their state board. 
• Only 33.26 percent of doctors who made 10 or more malpractice payments were 
disciplined by their state board – meaning two-thirds of doctors in this group of 
egregious repeat offenders were not disciplined at all. 
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Figure 13:  U.S. Doctors with Repeated Medical Malpractice Payments Who Were 
Disciplined (Reportable Licensure Actions) by State Medical Boards, 1990—2005 
 
 
Number of 
Payment 
Reports 
Number of 
Doctors Who 
Made Payments 
Number of Doctors With 
One or More Reportable 
Licensure Actions 
Percent of Doctors With One 
or More Reportable Licensure 
Actions 
2 or more 45,715 3,935 8.61% 
3 or more 17,596 2,061 11.71% 
4 or more 8,144 1,201 14.75% 
5 or more 4,019 733 17.92% 
10 or more 481 160 33.26% 
 
Many Serious Repeat Offender Doctors Are Not Disciplined 
 
The extent to which some doctors have repeated malpractice claims without being 
disciplined is illustrated by the following NPDB descriptions of 21 physicians licensed to 
practice medicine.  Even though they have between 4 and 31 malpractice payments (totaling 
more than $8 million per doctor), these physicians were not disciplined by their state medical 
boards. The physicians are not publicly identified; the NPDB protects the identity of these 
physicians by assigning a random number to each. 
 
• Physician Number 33041 had at least 31 malpractice payments between 1993 and 2005, 
nine for failure to use proper aseptic technique, five for unspecified errors, three for improper 
management of obstetrics cases, three for improper performance of surgery, three for retained 
foreign object during surgery, two for failure to treat, one for surgery on the wrong body part, 
one for failure to obtain consent for surgery, one for delay in treatment of fetal distress, one 
for failure to treat fetal distress, one for an improperly performed delivery, and once for 
improper technique. The total damages were $10,150,000. 
 
• Physician Number 43923 had at least 21 malpractice payments between 1992 and 2003, 
eight times for improperly performed surgeries, three times for unnecessary surgeries, twice 
for unspecified equipment errors, twice for surgeries on wrong body parts, a failure to obtain 
consent before surgery, a failure to obtain consent before blood work, a wrong treatment, an 
unspecified surgical error, a retained foreign body during surgery and an improper 
management of medication. The total damages were $8,722,500. 
 
• Physician Number 35454 had at least 18 malpractice payments between 1991 and 2005, 12 
times for improper performance of surgery, twice for improper management of surgery, once 
for equipment problems during surgery, once for failure to obtain consent for surgery, once 
for an unnecessary surgical procedure, and once for an unspecified surgical error. The total 
damages were $8,237,500.  
 
• Physician Number 14045 had at least 14 malpractice payments between 1991 and 2002, 12 
times for delayed performance or improper management of obstetrics cases, once for wrong 
treatment or procedure and once for an unspecified obstetrics error. The total damages were 
$10,175,000. 
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• Physician Number 59910 had at least 14 malpractice payments between 1994 and 2005, 
three for failure to monitor, three for improper performance, seven unspecified errors, and 
once for surgery on the wrong body part. The total damages were $10,555,000. 
 
• Physician Number 71888 had at least 14 malpractice payments between 1995 and 2004, 
once for failing to supervise, twice for failing to use proper aseptic technique, twice for 
improper delivery choice, once for improper treatment management, once for patient 
positioning, five for improperly performed surgeries, and four unspecified errors. The total 
damages were $8,007,500. 
 
• Physician Number 33166 had at least 13 malpractice payments between 1991 and 2005, 
nine for improper management, improper choice of delivery method, delay in performance or 
failure to treat fetal distress in obstetrics cases, one for improper performance of surgery, 
once for failure to diagnose, one for failing to use proper aseptic technique, and one 
unspecified obstetrics error. The total damages were $10,035,000. 
 
• Physician Number 118361 had at least 9 malpractice payments between 1998 and 2005, 6 
for unspecified errors, once for delay in performance, once for failing to use proper aseptic 
technique, and once for an improperly performed C-section. The total damages were 
$8,177,500. 
 
• Physician Number 25596 had at least 9 malpractice payments between 1992 and 2005, five 
for improper performance, twice for improper management of a pregnancy, once for 
improper delivery choice, and once for an unspecified obstetrics error. The total damages 
were $8,085,000.  
 
• Physician Number 23951 had at least 8 malpractice payments between 1992 and 2005, 
twice for wrong diagnoses, twice for unspecified treatment errors, twice for improper 
management of surgery, an improper performance of surgery, and a failure to obtain consent 
or a lack of informed consent.  The total damages were $11,215,000. 
 
• Physician Number 24852 had at least 7 malpractice payments between 1993 and 2003, four 
for improperly performed surgeries, twice for unspecified surgery errors, and once for an 
unspecified monitoring error. The total damages were $8,762,000. 
 
• Physician Number 17150 had at least 7 malpractice payments between 1992 and 2005, five 
for unspecified errors, once for an unnecessary surgical procedure, once for improper 
management, and once for failing to use proper aseptic technique. The total damages were 
$8,457,500. 
 
• Physician Number 26686 had at least 6 malpractice payments between 1994 and 2002, 
twice for improper management of pregnancies, an improperly performed C-section, an 
improperly performed procedure, a retained foreign body during surgery and an unspecified 
obstetrics error.  The total damages were $15,050,000. 
 
• Physician Number 493 had at least 6 malpractice payments between 1992 and 2003, twice 
for improperly performed surgeries, twice for unspecified surgical errors, a failure to perform 
surgery and an unspecified treatment error.  The total damages were $9,790,000. 
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• Physician Number 1994 had at least 6 malpractice payments between 1993 and 2002, once 
for a retained foreign body during surgery, improper performance of surgery, a delay in 
treatment, a delay in performance in an obstetrics case, once for an unspecified obstetrics 
error, and once for an unspecified surgery error. The total damages were $8,363,750. 
 
• Physician Number 127552 had at least 5 malpractice payments between 1998 and 2005, 
once for delay in diagnosis, once for failure to treat fetal distress, once for improper 
management, an improperly performed delivery, and a retained foreign body during surgery. 
The total damages were $8,470,000. 
 
• Physician Number 122127 had at least 4 malpractice payments between 1998 and 2002, 
twice for failure to use proper aseptic technique, a wrong diagnosis and an improperly 
managed surgery. The total damages were $12,890,000. 
 
• Physician Number 164595 had at least 4 malpractice payments between 2001 and 2005, 
once for failure to treat, and three times for failure to use proper aseptic technique. The total 
damages were $9,615,000. 
 
• Physician Number 182994 had at least 4 malpractice payments between 2002 and 2005, 
once for failing to perform a surgery, once for an improperly performed surgery, once for an 
unspecified surgery error, and once for a misdiagnosis. The total damages were $8,670,000. 
 
• Physician Number 21415 had at least 4 malpractice payments between 1991 and 2003, 
twice for delays in diagnosis, once for failing to use aseptic technique, and an unspecified 
obstetrics error.  The total damages were $8,577,500. 
 
• Physician Number 71514 had at least 4 malpractice payments between 1995 and 2001, 
twice for failures to diagnose and twice for failing to use proper aseptic technique. The total 
damages were $8,435,000. 
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 Part III:  Recommendations for Action 
 
 While data continue to show that the medical liability system produces rational outcomes, 
the government as well as health care providers can and should take steps to reduce preventable 
errors, protecting patients and doctors alike.  A “systems approach” to patient safety advocated 
by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) is an important tool to protect the health and safety of patients.  As 
noted earlier, in the 1980s, anesthesiologists showed that proactive measures to enhance patient 
safety are proven to save lives, reduce the number of lawsuits and cut costs.26   
 
We are encouraged by the passage of the Patient Safety Act of 2005, and call on the 
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate the necessary regulations and to 
implement the act as soon as possible.  Furthermore, we recommend the following: 
Improving Patient Safety Systems 
Congress Should Establish a National Mandatory Adverse Event Reporting System 
 Twenty-five states currently have legislation or regulations establishing adverse event 
reporting systems.27  Of these, 24 are mandatory.  Adverse event reporting systems allow 
hospitals to share information in order to conduct root cause analysis of adverse events, and 
subsequently improve patient safety by, for example, correcting faulty systems.  While these 
state reporting systems represent a positive step in patient safety, much more can be done.  
Federal policy makers should review the current state systems to determine the most effective 
methods for data collection and analysis.  To best protect all Americans, Congress should 
streamline error reporting by establishing a national mandatory adverse event reporting system 
based on the best practices demonstrated by the current state systems. 
 
Hospitals Should Use Computer Physician Order Entry Systems 
 Medication errors are among the most common preventable mistakes.  In July 2006, the 
Institute of Medicine released a report concluding that there are at least 1.5 million preventable 
medication errors that cost the U.S. over $3.5 billion.28  One of the recommendations in the IOM 
report is to “invest in technologies that have been demonstrated to be effective, but are not yet 
widely implemented in most organizations, such as computer physician order entry (CPOE)”.29  
CPOE is an electronic prescribing system that intercepts errors where they most commonly occur 
– at the time medications are ordered.  Physicians enter orders into a computer, rather than on 
paper, thus resolving potential miscommunications, and orders are automatically checked for 
potential problems, such as drug interactions or allergies.  In spite of these benefits, fewer than 5 
percent of hospitals have implemented CPOE.30
 
Hospitals Should Follow JCAHO Guidelines to Prevent Wrong Site Surgery 
 Amputating the wrong limb, operating on the wrong side of the body or the wrong patient 
– these are mistakes that should never occur in a modern hospital.  Nevertheless, in April 2006, 
USA Today quoted Dr. Dennis O’Leary, President of the JCAHO, as saying the problem is 
“getting worse.”31   
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In 2003, the JCAHO published guidelines for preventing wrong site surgery that include:  
 
• A pre-operative verification process to ensure that all parties are fully informed about the 
intended patient, procedure, and site; 
• Visibly marking the operative site; and 
• A “time out” period immediately preceding the procedure to conduct a final verification of 
the correct patient, procedure, and site. 
 
By implementing these simple pre-operative procedures, a terrible and costly form of medical 
error could be eradicated. 
 
Hospitals and Medical Practices Should Limit Physicians’ Workweeks to Reduce Fatigue-
Induced Error 
 American physicians are famous for their extensive work hours.  Researchers from 
Harvard Medical School, University of British Columbia, and hospitals in Massachusetts and 
British Columbia concluded that “extended-duration work shifts were associated with an 
increased risk of significant medical errors, adverse events, and attentional failures.”32  In 2003, 
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education issued duty hour standards for 
residents that limited residents to 80 hours on-duty per week, averaged over four weeks.  But 
these standards stop far short of an appropriate limit on the number of consecutive hours that it is 
safe for a physician to work.  By averaging the number of hours per week over a four-week 
period, residents can still be required to work in one session far longer than it is safe.  Duty hours 
for all physicians should be limited to 80 hours per week, not averaged over a month.  By 
legitimately limiting the number of consecutive work hours required of physicians, fatigue-
induced error could be considerably reduced. 
 
Hospitals Should Perform More Autopsies 
 In their 2000 report, To Err is Human, the Institute of Medicine noted that autopsies “are 
an excellent way to refine clinical judgment and identify misdiagnosis.”33  A 2002 report 
published by the Department of Health and Human Service Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) concluded that “[t]he use of autopsy data to correct inaccuracies in 
epidemiologic data would likely confer multiple benefits on the health care system as a whole.34  
Despite these benefits, the rate of autopsy in the U.S. has declined significantly over the years.  
According to the AHRQ, “[i]n 1994, the last year for which national U.S. data exist, the autopsy 
rate for all non-forensic deaths fell below 6 percent.”35
Improve Physician Oversight 
Congress Should Open the National Practitioner Data Bank 
 Information about doctor discipline, including state sanctions, hospital disciplinary 
actions, and medical malpractice awards, is now contained in the National Practitioner Data 
Bank (NPDB).  While the Department of Health and Human Services, which controls the NPDB, 
makes available a Public Use File for statistical research, the names of the doctors are kept secret 
from the public.  Congress should lift the veil of secrecy and allow individuals access to the 
information they need to make the best and most informed choice about which doctors they want 
to provide medical care for themselves and their families. 
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Congress Should Overhaul Medicare Quality Improvement Organizations 
 Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) are a national network of 53 organizations 
under the direction of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department of 
Health and Human Services.  QIOs are charged with ensuring that patients receive timely, 
quality healthcare and investigating complaints about substandard care.  Unfortunately, the 
system has broken down.  In March 2006, Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) wrote a letter to 
CMS stating that “there is sparse evidence that QIOs are effective.”36  Congress should instruct 
CMS to improve transparency and responsiveness in the beneficiary process.  QIO documents 
should be made subject to discovery in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. 
 
States Should Improve State Medical Board Web Sites 
 The ability of individuals to make informed decisions about their doctors is vital to 
consumer safety.  While now most state medical boards provide some physician information on 
Web sites, information about disciplinary actions varies greatly, is often inadequate, and can be 
difficult to access.37  In order to improve the quality and accessibility of information about 
doctor discipline, state legislatures should pass legislation requiring state medical boards to 
obtain and publish on the Internet verified criminal, malpractice, and hospital disciplinary 
information about physicians.  State medical boards should empower consumers to make 
informed choices when selecting a physician.  As Dr. Peter Lurie of Public Citizen’s Health 
Research Group recently noted, “[T]here can be no meaningful consumer choice if critical 
information is denied to patients.”38
 
States Should Reform State Medical Board Governance 
 Too many state medical boards are unhelpfully dependent on professional medical 
societies.  These links result in a lack of meaningful oversight on the part of state medical 
boards.  To resolve this problem, medical boards (and separate disciplinary boards, where 
present) should be appointed by the governor, and the governor’s choice of appointees should 
not be limited to a medical society’s nominees.  Furthermore, a minimum of 50 percent of the 
members of each state’s medical board should be well-informed and well-trained members of the 
public who have no ties to the health care industry, and, preferably, are experienced patient 
advocates.  Needless to say, medical boards’ top priority should always be protecting public 
health, not the careers of individual physicians. 
 
States Should Improve State Medical Board Funding and Staffing 
 In order for state medical boards to properly function, they require improved funding and 
staffing.  State legislatures should permit medical boards to spend all of the revenue from 
medical licensing fees, rather than forcing them to turn over a portion to the state treasury.  
Boards should hire adequate staff to investigate all complaints within 30 days, review all 
malpractice claims filed with the board, ensure compliance with reporting requirements, and 
monitor and regularly visit doctors who have been disciplined to ensure their compliance with 
imposed sanctions.  State medical boards should also hire investigators to review pharmacy 
records, consult with medical examiners, and perform targeted office audits of doctors practicing 
alone and suspected of substandard performance. 
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Please credit Public Citizen for information in this report as follows: Public Citizen’s 
analysis of malpractice payments as reported in the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Use 
File for the years 1990 to 2005.  
 
For a copy of data underlying any portion of this report, please contact Lara Chausow at 202-
454-5186.  
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